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Abstract. One of the key issues in the computational representation of open societies relates
to the introduction of norms that help to cope with the heterogeneity, the autonomy and
the diversity of interests among their members. Research regarding this issue presents two
omissions. One is the lack of a canonical model of norms that facilitates their implementation,
and that allows us to describe the processes of reasoning about norms. The other refers to con-
sidering, in the model of normative multi-agent systems, the perspective of individual agents
and what they might need to effectively reason about the society in which they participate.
Both are the concerns of this paper, and the main objective is to present a formal normative
framework for agent-based systems that facilitates their implementation.
Keywords: normative agents, normative multi-agent systems
1. Introduction
Norms have long been used as mechanisms to limit human autonomy in such
a way that coexistence between self-interested and untrusted people has been
made possible. They are indispensable to overcome problems of coordination
of large, complex and heterogeneous systems where total and direct social
control cannot be exerted. From this experience, the introduction of norms
that help to cope with the heterogeneity, the autonomy and the diversity
of interests among autonomous agents has been considered as a key issue
towards the computational representation of open societies of agents (Luck
et al., 2003).
The introduction of norms in agents and multi-agent systems is far from
trivial. Research on norms and agents has ranged from fundamental work
on the importance of norms in agent behaviour (Conte et al., 1999b), to
proposing internal representations of norms (Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995),
analysing the different types of norms (Dignum, 1999; Tuomela and Bonnevier-
Toumela, 1995), considering their emergence in groups of agents (Walker and
Wooldridge, 1995), proposing logics for their formalisation (van der Torre
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and Tan, 1999a; Sergot, 1999; Wieringa et al., 1996), and both analysing
and representing institutions controlled by norms (Balzer and Tuomela, 2001;
Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995). Norms can also be analysed from the inter-
nal point of view of agents and the role agents play in their processing. In
this case, we can describe for example, how agents manage norm adoption
and compliance (Boella and Lesmo, 2001; Dignum et al., 2000; Lo´pez y
Lo´pez et al., 2002), how agents responsible for enforcing norms must behave
(Castelfranchi et al., 1998), and what the characteristics are of agents entitled
to exert power in a society (Jones and Sergot, 1996). Taking into account the
different perspectives from which research has been done, it is no rare to find
many disparities and gaps between theories and, consequently, the work for
designers is hard when they try to develop applications based on normative
multi-agent systems.
For instance, although efforts have been made to describe and define the
different types of norms that agents have to deal with (Dignum, 1999; Singh,
1999), work has not led into a model that facilitates the computational rep-
resentation of any kind of norm. Each kind of norm appears to be different,
which also suggests that different processes of reasoning for an agent should
be proposed. There are also some work that introduces norms in systems of
agents to represent societies, institutions and organisations (Dellarocas and
Klein, 2001; Dignum and Dignum, 2001; Esteva et al., 2001; Shoham and
Tennenholtz, 1995). This research is primarily focused at the level of multi-
agent systems, where norms represent the means to achieve coordination
among their members. There, agents are assumed to be able to comply with
norms, to adopt new norms, and to obey the authorities of the system but
nothing is said about the reasons why agents might be willing to adopt and
comply with norms, nor about how agents can identify situations in which
an authority’s orders are beyond its responsibilities. That is, although agents
in such systems are said to be autonomous, their models of norms and sys-
tems regulated by norms do not offer the means to explain why autonomous
agents that are working to satisfy their own goals, still comply with their
social responsibilities. The game-theoretical approach of norms (Axelrod,
1986; Bicchieri, 1990; Hashimoto and Egashira, 2001; Ullmann-Margalit,
1977; Walker and Wooldridge, 1995) explains this situation as a result of
agents applying strategies that enable them to converge to situations that are
beneficial for a group of interacting agents. Having found such a strategy,
it becomes a norm for all the members in the group, and since this norm is
agreed by all agents, it is always complied with by them. Although inter-
esting, this approach is not useful for the aims of our work, because rather
than being concerned with the process of how a specific norm is created, our
research focuses on the modelling of different types of norms and on speci-
fying each one of the internal processes that explain the normative behaviour
of agents in situations such as the observed by game-theoretical approaches.
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Now, although the importance of modelling compliance with norms as
an autonomous decision has been identified by several researchers (Castel-
franchi et al., 2000; Conte et al., 1999a; Conte and Dellarocas, 2001; Conte
et al., 1999b), the issue is only partly addressed by others whose proposals
for norm compliance generally rely on specific decision-making strategies
based on how much an agent gains or loses by complying with (Barbuceanu
et al., 1999; Dignum et al., 2000), and on the probability of being caught by
a defender of a norm (Boella and Lesmo, 2001). We consider these cases as
very specific and, therefore, inadequate to model different kinds of normative
behaviour of autonomous agents.
As a way to overcome these omissions, we have developed a norma-
tive framework for agent-based systems that includes a canonical model of
norms, a model of normative multi-agent systems and a model of normative
autonomous agents. The framework provides the means to understand the
normative behaviour of autonomous agents and to facilitate their implementa-
tion. Independent components of this framework have already been presented
in different forums (Lo´pez y Lo´pez and Luck, 2003; Lo´pez y Lo´pez and
Luck, 2004; Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al., 2002; Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al., 2004), here
the framework is presented as a whole. Moreover, although we recognise
the importance of deontic logic as a formalism to represent knowledge and
reasoning about the behaviour of agents into systems regulated by norms,
we use the Z language, which is based on set-theory and first order logic
(Spivey, 1992), to present the formal model of our framework because there
are tools that allow verification and methodologies that guide the translation
of formalizations into code.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. First, a formal definition of
autonomous agents is given. After that, an analysis of different properties of
norms is provided. This analysis is then used to justify the elements that a
general model of a norm must include in order to enable autonomous agents
to reason about them. Next, the main properties of systems of autonomous
agents that are regulated by norms are discussed and a model is presented.
Then, we describe our proposal to enable agents to reason about norms.
Finally, our conclusions are provided.
2. Autonomous Agents
The foundations of this work are taken from Luck and d’Inverno’s SMART
agent framework (d’Inverno and Luck, 2003) whose concept of motivations
as the driving force that affects the reasoning of agents in satisfying their
goals is considered as the underlying argument for agents to voluntarily com-
ply with norms and to voluntarily enter and remain in a society. In the SMART
agent framework, an attribute represents a perceivable feature of the agent’s
environment, which can be represented as a predicate or its negation. Then,
a particular state in the environment is described by a set of attributes, a
A Normative Framework for Agent-Based Systems 4
goal represents situations that an agent wishes to bring about, motivations
are desires or preferences that affect the outcome of the reasoning intended to
satisfy an agent’s goals, and actions are discrete events that change the state of
the environment when performed. For the purposes of this paper, we formally
describe environmental states, goals, actions and autonomous agents. Details
of the remaining elements are not needed, so we simply consider them as
given sets.
[Attribute,Motivation]
EnvState == P1Attribute
Goal == P1Attribute
Action == EnvState → EnvState
In the schema below, an autonomous agent is described by a set of goals
that it wants to bring about, a set of capabilities that it is able to perform, a
non-empty set of motivations representing its preferences, and a set of beliefs
representing its vision about the external world. We also assume that the agent
is able to determine the importance of its goals, which depends on its current
motivations. In this way, the more motivated a goal the higher its importance.
AutonomousAgent
goals : PGoal ;
capabilities : PAction;
motivations : PMotivation;
beliefs : P1Attribute
importance : P(PGoal × PMotivation)→ N
goals 6= ∅; motivations 6= ∅
∀ x : PGoal , y : PMotivation •
(x , y) ∈ dom importance |
x ⊆ goals ∧ y ⊆ motivations
3. Norms
Norms not only have been studied from the philosophical, social and le-
gal points of views (Ross, 1968; Tuomela, 1995) but also from the game-
theoretical approach (Axelrod, 1986; Bicchieri, 1990; Hashimoto and Egashira,
2001; Ullmann-Margalit, 1977; Walker and Wooldridge, 1995). Research on
norms is also a main issue for both the Artificial Intelligence and the Au-
tonomous Agents communities (Boella and Lesmo, 2001; Castelfranchi et al.,
2000; Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995; Dignum et al., 2000; Dignum, 1999;
Jones and Sergot, 1996; Lo´pez y Lo´pez, 2003; Sergot, 1999; Singh, 1999;
Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995; van der Torre and Tan, 1999a; van der Torre
and Tan, 1999b). So, reaching a common definition of norm seems to be
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impossible. Nevertheless, we can provide some characteristics for a norm
that allow us to identify the main components of a norm and, consequently,
to define and represent normative concepts.
Norms facilitate mechanisms to drive the behaviour of agents, especially
in those cases when their behaviour affects other agents. Norms can be char-
acterised by their prescriptiveness, sociality, and social pressure. In other
words,
− a norm tells an agent how to behave (prescriptiveness);
− in situations where more than one agent is involved (sociality);
− and since it is always expected that norms conflict with the personal
interest of some agents, socially acceptable mechanisms to force agents
to comply with norms are needed (social pressure).
By analysing these properties, the essential components of a norm can
be identified.
3.1. NORM COMPONENTS
Norms specify patterns of behaviour for a set of agents. These patterns are
sometimes represented as actions to be performed (Axelrod, 1986; Tuomela,
1995), or restrictions to be imposed over an agent’s actions (Norman et al.,
1998; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995). At other times, patterns of behaviour
are specified through goals that must either be satisfied or avoided by agents
(Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995; Singh, 1999). Now, since actions are per-
formed in order to change the state of an environment, goals are states that
agents want to bring about, and restrictions can be seen as goals to be avoided,
we argue that by considering goals the other two patterns of behaviour can be
easily represented (as shown in (Lo´pez y Lo´pez and Luck, 2003)).
In brief, norms specify things that ought to be done and, consequently,
a set of normative goals must be included. Sometimes, these normative goals
must be directly intended, while at other times their role is to inhibit specific
states (as in the case of prohibitions). Norms are always directed at a set of
addressee agents, which are directly responsible for the satisfaction of the
normative goals. Moreover, sometimes to take decisions regarding norms,
agents not only consider what must be done but also for whom it must be
done. Then, agents that benefit from the satisfaction of normative goals may
also be included.
In general, norms are not applied all the time, but only in particular
circumstances or within a specific context. Thus, norms must always specify
the situations in which addressee agents must fulfill them. Exception states
may also be included to represent situations in which addressees cannot be
punished when they have not complied with norms. Exceptions represent
immunity states for all addressee agents in a particular situation (Ross, 1968).
A Normative Framework for Agent-Based Systems 6
Now, to ensure that personal interests do not impede the fulfillment of norms,
mechanisms either to promote compliance with norms, or to inhibit devia-
tion from them, are needed. Norms may include rewards to be given when
normative goals become satisfied, or punishments to be applied when they
are not. Both rewards and punishments are the means for addressee agents to
determine what might happen whatever decision they take regarding norms.
They are not the responsibility of addressees agents but of other agents al-
ready entitled to either reward or punish compliance and non-compliance
with norms. Since rewards and punishments represent states to be achieved,
it is natural to consider them as goals but, in contrast with normative goals
that must be satisfied by addressees, punishments and rewards are satisfied
by agents entitled to do so.
In other words, a norm must be considered for fulfillment by an agent
when certain environmental states, not included as exception states, hold.
Such a norm forces a group of addressee agents to satisfy some normative
goals for a (possibly empty) set of beneficiary agents. In addition, agents
are aware that rewards may be enjoyed if norms become satisfied, or that
punishments that affect their current goals can be applied if not.
Norm
normativegoals : PGoal
addressees : PNormativeAgent
beneficiaries : PNormativeAgent
context : EnvState
exceptions : EnvState
rewards : PGoal
punishments : PGoal
normativegoals 6= ∅
addressees 6= ∅
context 6= ∅
context ∩ exceptions = ∅
rewards ∩ punishments = ∅
The formal specification of a norm is given in the Norm schema where
all the components of norms described above are included, together with
some constraints on them. First, it does not make any sense to have norms
specifying nothing, norms directed at nobody, or norms that either never or
always become applied. Thus, the first three predicates in the schema state
that the set of normative goals, the set of addressee agents, and the context
must never be empty. The fourth predicate states that the set of attributes
describing both the context and exceptions must be disjoint to avoid incon-
sistencies in identifying whether a norm must be applied. The final constraint
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specifies that punishments and rewards are also consistent and, therefore, they
must be disjoint.
3.2. CONSIDERATIONS
The term norm has been used as a synonym for obligations (Boella and
Lesmo, 2001; Dignum et al., 2000), prohibitions (Dignum, 1999), social laws
(Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995), and other kinds of rules imposed by so-
cieties (or by an authority). The position of our work is quite different. It
considers that all these terms can be grouped in a general definition of a
norm, because they have the same properties (i.e. prescriptiveness, sociality
and social pressure) and they can be represented by the same model. They
all represent responsibilities for addressee agents, and create expectations for
beneficiaries and other agents. They are also the means to support benefi-
ciaries when they have to claim some compensation in the situations where
norms are not fulfilled as expected. Moreover, whatever the kind of norm
being considered, its fulfillment may be rewarded, and its violation may be
penalised. What makes one norm different from another is the way in which
they are created, their persistence, and the components that are obligatory
in the norm. Thus, norms might be created by an agent designer as built-
in norms, they can be the result of agreements between agents, or they can
be elaborated by a complex legal system. Regarding their persistence, norms
might be taken into account during different periods of time, such as until an
agent dies, as long as an agent stays in a society, or just for a short period of
time until its normative goals become satisfied. Finally, some components of a
norm might not exist; there are norms that include neither punishments nor re-
wards, even though they are complied with. Some of these characteristics can
be used to provide a classification of norms into four main categories: obliga-
tions, prohibitions, social commitments and social codes (Lo´pez y Lo´pez and
Luck, 2003). Despite these differences, all types of norms can be reasoned
about in similar ways.
Now, to understand the consequences of norms in a particular system, it
is necessary to consider norms that are either fulfilled or unfulfilled. However,
since most of the time a norm has a set of agents as addressees, the meaning of
fulfilling a norm might depend on the interpretation of analysers of a system.
In small groups of agents, it might be easy to consider a norm as fulfilled
when every addressee agent has fulfilled the norm; by contrast, in larger
societies, a proportion of agents complying with a norm will be enough to
consider it as fulfilled. Instead of defining fulfilled norms in general, it is
more appropriate to define norms being fulfilled by a particular addressee
agent. To do so, the concept of norm instances is introduced as follows. Once
a norm is adopted by an agent, a norm instance is created, which represents
the internalisation of a norm by an agent (Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995). A
norm instance is a copy of the original norm that is now used as a mental
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attitude from which new goals for the agent might be inferred. Norms and
norm instances are the same concept used for different purposes. Norms are
abstract specifications that exist in a society and are known by all agents
(Tuomela, 1995), but agents work with instances of these norms. Conse-
quently, there must be a separate instance for each addressee of a norm. Due
to space constraints, formal definitions and examples of categories of norms,
norm instances and fulfilled norms are not provided here but can be found
elsewhere (Lo´pez y Lo´pez and Luck, 2003).
3.3. INTERLOCKING NORMS
The norms of a system are not isolated from each other; sometimes, com-
pliance with them is a condition to trigger (or activate) other norms. That is,
there are norms that prescribe how some agents must behave in situations
in which other agents either comply with a norm or do not comply with it
(Ross, 1968). For example, when employees comply with their obligations in
an office, paying their salary becomes an obligation of the employer; or when
a plane cannot take-off, providing accommodation to passengers becomes a
responsibility of the airline. Norms related in this way can make a complete
chain of norms because the newly activated norms can, in turn, activate new
ones. Now, since triggering a norm depends on past compliance with another
norm, we call these kinds of norms interlocking norms. The norm that gives
rise to another norm is called the primary norm, whereas the norm activated as
a result of either the fulfillment or violation of the first is called the secondary
norm.
In terms of the norm model mentioned earlier, the context is a state that
must hold for a norm to be complied with. Since the fulfillment of a norm
is assessed through its normative goals, the context of the secondary norm
must include the satisfaction (or non-satisfaction) of all the primary norm’s
normative goals. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of both the primary and the
secondary norms and how they are interlocked through the primary norm’s
normative goals and the secondary norm’s context.
 
satisfied (or unsatisfied)  normative goals   
normative goals exceptions context . . . . . . 
normative goals exceptions context . . . . . . 
primary norm  
secondary norm   
Figure 1. Interlocking Norm Structure
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Formally, a norm is interlocked with another norm by non-compliance
if, in the context of the secondary norm, an instance of the primary norm can
be considered as violated. This means that when any addressee of a norm
does not fulfill the norm, the corresponding interlocking norm will be trig-
gered. The formal specification of this is given below, where n1 represents
the primary norm and n2 is the secondary norm.
lockedbynoncompliance : P(Norm ×Norm)
∀n1,n2 : Norm •
lockedbynoncompliance (n1,n2)⇔
(∃ni : NormInstance |
isnorminstance (ni ,n1) •
¬ fulfilled (ni ,n2.context))
Similarly, a norm is interlocked with another norm by compliance if, in
the context of the secondary norm, an instance of the primary norm can be
considered as fulfilled. Thus, any addressee of the norm that fulfills it will
trigger the interlocking norm. The specification of this is given as follows.
lockedbycompliance : P(Norm ×Norm)
∀n1,n2 : Norm •
lockedbycompliance (n1,n2)⇔
(∃ni : NormInstance |
isnorminstance (ni ,n1) •
fulfilled (ni ,n2.context))
Having the means to relate norms in this way allows us to model how
the normative behaviour of agents that are addressees of a secondary norm
is influenced by the normative behaviour of addressees of a primary norm.
As can be observed, these relationships can be exploited to represent the so
called contrary-to-duty norms.
4. Normative Multi-Agent Systems
Since norms are social concepts, they cannot be studied independently of the
systems for which they are created and, consequently, an analysis of the nor-
mative aspects of social systems must be provided. Although social systems
that are regulated by norms are different from one another, some general char-
acteristics can be identified. They consist of a set of agents that are controlled
by the same set of norms ranging from obligations and social commitments
to social codes. However, whereas there are static systems in which all norms
are defined in advance and agents in the system always comply with them
(Boman, 1999; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995), a more realistic view of
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these kinds of systems suggests that when autonomous agents are considered,
neither can all norms be known in advance (since new conflicts among agents
may emerge and, therefore, new norms may be needed), nor can compliance
with norms be guaranteed (since agents can decide not to comply). We can
say then, that systems regulated by norms must include mechanisms to deal
with both the modification of norms and the unpredictable normative be-
haviour of autonomous agents. So, normative multi-agent systems have the
following characteristics.
− Membership. Agents in a society must be able to deal with norms but,
above all, they must recognise themselves as part of the system. This
kind of social identification means that agents adopt the society norms
and, by doing so, they show their willingness to comply with these
norms.
− Social Pressure. Effective authority cannot be exerted if penalties or
incentives are not applied when norms are either violated or complied
with. However, this control must not be an agent’s arbitrary decision, and
although it is only exerted by some agents, it must be socially accepted.
− Dynamism. Normative systems are dynamic by nature. New norms are
created and obsolete norms are abolished. Compliance or non-compliance
with norms may activate other norms and, therefore, force other agents
to act. Agents can either join or leave the system. The normative be-
haviour of agent members might be unexpected, and it may influence
the behaviour of other agents.
Given these characteristics, we argue that multi-agent systems must in-
clude mechanisms to defend norms, to allow their modification, and to iden-
tify authorities. Moreover, their members must be agents able to deal with
norms. Each one of these concepts is discussed in detail and formalised in
(Lo´pez y Lo´pez and Luck, 2004), here, we present just a summary of them.
4.1. NORMATIVE AGENTS
The effectiveness of every structure of control relies on the capabilities of its
members to recognise and follow its norms. However, given that agents are
autonomous, the fulfillment of norms can never be taken for granted (Lo´pez y
Lo´pez et al., 2002). We say that a normative agent is an agent whose be-
haviour is partly shaped by norms. They are able to deal with norms because
they can represent, adopt, and comply with them. However, for autonomous
agents, decisions to adopt or comply with norms are made on the basis of their
own goals and motivations. That is, autonomous agents are not only able to
act on norms but also they are able to reason about them. In what follows,
all normative agents are considered as autonomous agents that have adopted
some norms (norms) and, has decided which norms to comply with (intended
norms) and which norms to reject (rejected norms). Although their normative
behaviour is described in the next section, their representation is given now
in the schema below.
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NormativeAgent
AutonomousAgent
norms, intented , rejected : PNorm
intented ⊆ norms
rejected ⊆ norms
4.2. ENFORCEMENT AND REWARD NORMS
Particularly interesting for this work are the norms triggered in order to pun-
ish offenders of other norms. We call them enforcement norms and their
addressees are the defenders of a norm. These norms represent exerted social
pressure because they specify not only who must apply the punishments, but
also under which circumstances these punishments must be applied (Ross,
1968). That is, once the violation of a norm becomes identified by defenders,
their duty is to start a process in which offender agents can be punished. For
example, if there is an obligation to pay accommodation fees for all students
in a university, there must also be a norm stating what hall managers must do
when a student refuses to pay.
As can be seen, norms that enforce other norms are a special case of
interlocking norms because besides being interlocked by non-compliance,
the normative goals of the secondary norm must include every punishment
of the primary norm. Figure 2 shows how the structures of both norms are
related. By modelling enforcement norms in this way, we cause an offender’s
punishments to be consistent with a defender’s responsibilities. Addressees
of an enforced norm (i.e. the primary norm) know what could happen if the
norm is not complied with, and addressees of an enforcement norm (i.e. the
secondary norm) know what must be done in order to punish the offenders
of another norm. Enforcement norms allow the authority of defenders to be
clearly constrained.
 
normative goals punishments context . . . . . . 
unsatisfied normative goals 
enforced norm 
enforcement norm 
normative goals exceptions context . . . . . . 
Figure 2. Enforcement Norm Structure
Formally, the relationship between a norm directed to control the be-
haviour of some agents and a norm directed at punishing the offenders of
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such a norm can be defined as follows. A norm enforces another norm if
the first norm is activated when the second is violated, and all punishments
associated with the violated norm are part of the normative goals of the first.
Every norm satisfying this property is known as an enforcement norm.
enforces : P(Norm ×Norm)
∀n1,n2 : Norm • enforces (n1,n2)⇔
lockedbynoncompliance (n2,n1) ∧
n2.punishments ⊆ n1.normativegoals
So far we have described some interlocking norms in terms of punish-
ments because these are one of the more commonly used mechanisms to
enforce compliance with norms. However, a similar analysis can be applied
to interlocking norms corresponding to the process of rewarding members
doing their duties. These norms must be interlocked by compliance and all
the rewards included in the primary norm (rewarded norm) must be included
in the normative goals of the secondary norm (reward norm). The relation
between these norms is shown in Figure 3.
 
normative goals rewards context . . . . . . 
satisfied normative goals 
rewarded norm 
reward norm 
normative goals exceptions context . . . . . . 
Figure 3. Reward Norm Structure
Formally, we say that a norm encourages compliance with another norm
if the first norm is activated when the second norm becomes fulfilled, and
the rewards associated with the fulfilled norm are part of the normative goals
of the first norm. Every norm satisfying this property is known as a reward
norm.
rewardnorm : P(Norm ×Norm)
∀n1,n2 : Norm • rewardnorm (n1,n2)⇔
lockedbycompliance (n2,n1) ∧
n2.rewards ⊆ n1.normativegoals
It is important to mention that this way of representing enforcement
and reward norms can create an infinite chain of norms because we would
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also have to define norms to apply when authorities or defenders do not
comply with their obligations, either to punish those agents breaking rules
or to reward those agents that fulfill their responsibilities (Ross, 1968). The
decision of when to stop this interlocking of norms is left to the creator of
norms. If a system requires it, the model (and formalisation) for enforcing
and encouraging norms can be used recursively as necessary. There is nothing
in the definition of the model itself to prevent this.
Both enforcement and reward norms acquire particular relevance in sys-
tems regulated by norms because the abilities to punish and reward must be
restricted for use only by competent authorities (addressees of enforcement
and reward norms). Otherwise, offenders might be punished twice or more
if many agents take this as their responsibility. It could also be the case that
selfish agents demand unjust punishments or that selfish offenders reject be-
ing punished. That is, conflicts of interest might emerge in a society if such
responsibilities are given either to no one or to anyone. Only through enforce-
ment and reward norms can agents become entitled to punish or reward other
agents.
4.3. LEGISLATION NORMS
Norms are introduced into a society as a means to achieve social order. Some
are intended to avoid conflicts between agents, others to allow the establish-
ment of commitments, and others still to unify the behaviour of agents as
a means of social identification. However, neither all conflicts nor all com-
mitments can be anticipated. Consequently, there must exist the possibility
of creating new norms (to solve unexpected and recurrent conflicts among
agents), modifying existing ones (to increase their effectiveness), or even
abolishing those that become obsolete. As above, these capabilities must be
restricted to avoid conflicts of interest. That is, norms stating when actions to
legislate are permitted must exist in a normative multi-agent system (Jones
and Sergot, 1996). Formally, we say that a norm is a legislation norm if
actions to issue and to abolish norms are permitted by this norm in the current
environment. These constraints are specified below.
legislate : P(Norm × EnvState)
∀n : Norm; env : EnvState •
legislate (n, env)⇔
(∃ issuingnorms, abolishnorms : Action •
permitted (issuingnorms,n, env) ∨
permitted (abolishnorms,n, env))
4.4. NORMATIVE MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS MODEL
A normative multi-agent system is formally represented in theNormativeMAS
schema. It comprises a set of normative agent members (i.e. agents able to
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reason about norms) and a set of general norms that govern the behaviour of
these agents (generalnorms). Norms issued to allow the creation and abo-
lition of norms (legislationnorms) are also included. There are also norms
dedicated to enforcing other norms (enforcenorms) and norms directed to
encouraging compliance with norms through rewards (rewardnorms). Legis-
lation, enforcement and reward norms are better discussed in (Lo´pez y Lo´pez
and Luck, 2004). The current state of the environment is represented by the
variable environment . Constraints over these components are imposed as
follows. Although it is possible that agents do not know all the norms in the
system, it is always expected that they at least adopt some norms, represented
by the first predicate. The second predicate makes explicit that addressees of
norms must be members of the system. Thus, addressee agents of every norm
must be included in the set of member agents because it does not make any
sense to have norms addressed to nonexistent agents. The last three predicates
respectively describe the structure of enforcement, reward and legislation
norms. Notice that whereas every enforcement norm must have a norm to
enforce, not every norm may have a corresponding enforcement norm, in
which case no one in the society is legally entitled to punish an agent that
does not fulfill such a norm.
NormativeMAS
members : PNormativeAgent
generalnorms, legislationnorms : PNorm
enforcenorms, rewardnorms : PNorm
environment : EnvState
∀ ag : members •
ag .norms ∩ generalnorms 6= ∅
∀ sn : generalnorms •
sn.addressees ⊆ members
∀ en : enforcenorms •
(∃n : generalnorms • enforces (en,n))
∀ rn : rewardnorms •
(∃n : generalnorms • rewardnorm (rn,n))
∀ ln : legislationnorms •
legislate (ln, environment)
4.5. NORMATIVE ROLES
Defining normative multi-agent systems in this way allows the identifica-
tion of the authorities of the system as formalised in the AuthoritiesNMAS
schema. The set of agents that are entitled to create, modify, or abolish norms
is called legislators. No other members of the society are endowed with this
authority, and generally they are either elected or imposed by other agents.
Defender agents are directly responsible for the application of punishments
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when norms are violated. That is, their main responsibility is to monitor
compliance with norms in order to detect transgressions. Moreover, they can
also warn agents by advertising the bad consequences of being rebellious. By
contrast, promoter agents are those whose responsibilities include rewarding
compliant addressees. These agents also monitor compliance with norms in
order to determine when rewards must be given, and instead of enforcing
compliance with norms, they simply encourage it.
AuthoritiesNMAS
NormativeMAS
legislators : PNormativeAgent
defenders : PNormativeAgent
promoters : PNormativeAgent
∀ lg : legislators • (∃ l : legislationnorms •
lg ∈ l .addressees)
∀ df : defenders • (∃ e : enforcenorms •
df ∈ e.addressees)
∀ pm : promoters • (∃ r : rewardnorms •
pm ∈ r .addressees)
5. Autonomous Normative Reasoning
Whereas agents that always comply with norms are important for the design
of societies in which total control is needed (Boman, 1999; Shoham and
Tennenholtz, 1995), agents that can decide on the basis of their own goals
and motivations whether to comply with them are important for the design of
dynamic systems in which agents act on behalf of different users and, while
satisfying their own goals, are able to join a society and cooperate with other
agents. Autonomous norm reasoning is important to address those situations
in which an agent’s goals conflict with the norms that control its behaviour
inside a society. Agents that deliberate about norms are also needed in sys-
tems in which unforseen events might occur, and in those situations in which
agents are faced with conflicting norms, and they have to choose between
them. It should be clear that violation of norms is, sometimes, justified. To
describe normative reasoning, therefore, we have to explain not only what
might motivate an agent to adopt, dismiss or complying with a norm, but
also the way in which this decision affects its goals. In consequence we
propose three different normative reasoning processes: one for agents to de-
cide whether to adopt a norm (the norm adoption process), another to decide
whether to comply with a norm (the norm deliberation process), and the other
to update the goals, and therefore the intentions of agents accordingly (the
norm compliance process). All these processes must take into account not
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only the goals and motivations of agents, but also the mechanisms of the
society to avoid violation of norms such as rewards and punishments. Thus,
agents consider the so called social pressure of norms before making any
decision.
5.1. THE NORM ADOPTION PROCESS
The norm adoption process can be better defined as the process through which
agents recognise their responsibilities towards other agents by internalising
the norms that specify these responsibilities. Thus, agents adopt the norms of
a society either once they have decided to join it or in the case a new norm
is issued while they are still there. For autonomous agents to join and stay in
a society the social satisfaction condition must hold (Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al.,
2004). An agent considers this condition as satisfied if, although some of its
goals become hindered by its responsibilities, its important goals can still be
satisfied. Thus, we consider that the following conditions must be satisfied for
agents to adopt a norm: the agent must recognise itself as an addressee of the
norm; the norm must not already be adopted; the norm must have been issued
by a recognised authority; and the agent must have reasons to stay in the
society. Notice that to adopt a norm as an end, only the first three conditions
are needed, whereas the last condition is an indicator that the decision to
adopt a norm is made in an autonomous way. Due to space constraints, the
NormAdoption schema only formalises the first three conditions but details
of the fourth condition can be found elsewhere (Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al., 2004).
NormAdoption
∆NormativeAgent
new? : Norm
issuer?, self : NormativeAgent
authorities : PNormativeAgent
issuedby : P(Norm ×NormativeAgent)
self ∈ new?.addressees
new? 6∈ norms
(new?, issuer?) ∈ issuedby ⇔
issuer? ∈ authorities
norms ′ = norms ∪ {new?}
5.2. THE NORM DELIBERATION PROCESS
To comply with the norm, agents assess two things: the goals that might be
hindered by satisfying the normative goals, and the goals that might benefit
from the associated rewards. By contrast, to reject a norm, agents evaluate the
damaging effects of punishments (i.e. the goals hindered due to the satisfac-
tion of the goals associated with punishments.) Since the satisfaction of some
of their goals might be prevented in both cases, agents use the importance of
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their goals to make these decisions. The importance of goals is a term related
to an agent’s motivations (d’Inverno and Luck, 2003) in such a way that the
more motivated a goal the higher its importance. Thus, to deliberate about a
norm, agents follow these steps.
− A set of active norms is selected from the set of adopted norms (norm
instances). Active norms are those that agents believe must be complied
with in the current state, which is not an exception state (i.e. those norms
for which the context matches the beliefs of the agent).
− The agent divides active norms into non-conflicticting and conflicting
norms. An active norm is non-conflicting if its compliance does not
cause any conflict with one of the agent’s current goals. Thus, no goals
of the addressee agent are hindered by satisfying the normative goals
of the norm. By contrast, an active norm is conflicting if its fulfillment
hinders any of the agent’s goals.
− For each one of these sets of norms, the agent must decide which one to
comply with. Details of different ways to select the norms to be intended
or rejected are given in (Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al., 2002). Here only one of
them is explained later on. After norm deliberation, the set of intended
norms consists of those conflicting and non-conflicting norms that are
accepted to be complied with by the agent, and the set of rejected norms
consists of all conflicting and non-conflicting norms that are rejected by
the agent.
NormAgentState
NormativeAgent
activenorms, conflicting : PNorm
∀n : activenorms • conflicting n ⇔
hinder(goals,n.ngoals) 6= ∅
activenorms ⊆ norms
∀ an : activenorms •
logcon (beliefs, an.context)
activenorms = intended ∪ rejected
hinder(goals,normgoals intended) = ∅
benefit(goals, rewardgoals intended)
∩goals = ∅
hinder(goals, punishgoals rejected) = ∅
The state of an agent that has selected the norms it is keen to fulfill is for-
mally represented in the NormAgentState schema above. This represents a
normative agent with a variable representing the sets of active norms at a par-
ticular point of time. The conflicting predicate holds for a norm if and only
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if its normative goals conflict (hinder ) with any of the agent’s current goals.
The next three predicates state that active norms are the subset of adopted
norms that the agent believes must be complied with in the current state
and that, the set of active norms has already been assessed and divided into
norms to intend and norms to reject. The state of an agent is consistent in that
its current goals do not conflict with the intended norms and, consequently,
no normative goal must be in conflict with current goals. Moreover, since
rewards benefit the achievement of some goals, so that agents do not have to
work on their satisfaction because someone else does, these goals must not be
part of the goals of an agent. The final predicate states that punishments must
be accepted and, therefore, none of the goals of an agent must hinder them.
For a norm to be intended, some constraints must be fulfilled. First, the
agent must be an addressee of the norm. Then, the norm must be an adopted
and currently active norm, and it must not be already intended. In addition,
the agent must believe that it is not in an exception state and, therefore, it
must comply with the norm. Formally, the process to accept a single norm
as input (new?) to be complied with is specified in the NormIntend schema.
The first five predicates represent the constraints on the agent and the norm as
described above. The sixth predicate represents the addition of the accepted
norm to the set of intended norms and the final predicate represents the set of
rejected norms remains the same.
NormIntend
new? : Norm
∆NormAgentState
self ∈ new?.addressees
new? ∈ norms
new? ∈ activenorms
new? 6∈ intended
¬ logcon(beliefs,new?.exceptions)
intended ′ = intended ∪ {new?}
rejected ′ = rejected
The process to reject a norm (NormReject) can be defined similarly.
Now, there are different ways to select the norms to be intended or rejected as
explained in (Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al., 2002). Here, we describe what is called a
pressured strategy where an agent fulfills a norm only in the case that one of
its goals is threatened by punishments. That is, agents are pressured to obey
norms through the application of punishments that might hinder some of their
important goals. In this situation, the agent faces four different cases.
1. The norm is a non-conflicting norm and some goals are hindered by its
punishments.
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2. The norm is a non-conflicting norm and there are no goals hindered by
its punishments.
3. The norm is a conflicting norm and the goals hindered by its normative
goals are less important than the goals hindered by its punishments.
4. The norm is a conflicting norm and the goals hindered by its normative
goals are more important than the goals hindered by its punishments.
The first case represents the situation in which, by complying with a
norm, an agent does not put at risk any of its goals (because the norm is non-
conflicting), but if the agent decides not to fulfill it, some of its goals could
be unsatisfied due to punishments. Consequently, fulfilling a norm is the best
decision for this kind of agent. To formalise this, we use the NormIntend
operation schema to accept complying with the norm, and we add two pred-
icates to specify that this strategy is applied to non-conflicting norms whose
punishments hinder some goals.
PressuredNCComply
NormIntend
¬ conflicting new?
hinder(goals,new?.punishments) 6= ∅
In the second case, by contrast, since punishments do not affect an agent’s
goals, it does not make any sense to comply with the norm, so it must be re-
jected. Formally, the NormReject operation schema is used when the norm is
non-conflicting (first predicate) and its associated punishments do not hinder
any existing goals (second predicate).
PressuredNCReject
NormReject
¬ conflicting new?
hinder(goals,new?.punishments) = ∅
According to our definition, a conflicting norm is a norm whose nor-
mative goals hinder an agent’s goals. In this situation, agents comply with
the norm at the expense of existing goals only if what they can lose through
punishments is more important than what they can lose by complying with
the norm. Formally, a conflicting norm is intended if the goals that could
be hindered by punishments (hps) are more important than the set of ex-
isting goals hindered by normative goals (hngs). This is represented in the
PressuredCComply schema where the importance function uses the moti-
vations associated with the set of goals to find the importance of goals.
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PressuredCComply
NormIntend
conflicting new?
let hps == hinder(goals,
new?.punishments) •
let hngs == hinder(goals,new?.ngoals) •
importance (motivations, hps) >
importance (motivations, hngs)
However, if the goals hindered by normative goals are more important
than the goals hindered by punishment, agents prefer to face such punish-
ments for the sake of their important goals and, therefore, the norm is rejected.
Formally, a conflicting norm is rejected by using the NormReject operation
schema if the goals hindered by its punishments (hps) are less important than
the goals hindered by its normative goals (hngs).
PressuredCReject
NormReject
conflicting new?
let hps == hinder(goals,new?.punishments) •
let hngs == hinder(goals,new?.ngoals) •
importance (motivations, hps) ≤
importance (motivations, hngs)
All these cases are illustrated in Figure 4




conflicting 
norm 
hps ≠ ∅ 
non-conflicting 
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Figure 4. Pressured Norm Compliance
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5.3. THE NORM COMPLIANCE PROCESS
Once agents take a decision about which norms to fulfill, a process of norm
compliance must be started in order to update an agent’s goals in accordance
with the decisions it has made. An agent’s goals are affected in different ways,
depending on whether the norm is intended or rejected. The cases can be
listed as follows.
− All normative goals (ngs) of an intended norm must be added to the set
of goals because the agent has decided to comply with it.
− Some goals (hngs) are hindered by the normative goals of an intended
norm. These goals can no longer be achieved because the agent prefers
to comply with the norm and, consequently, this set of goals must be
removed from the agent’s goals.
− Some goals (brs) benefit from the rewards of an intended norm. Rewards
contribute to the satisfaction of these goals without the agent having to
make any extra effort. As a result, those goals that benefit from rewards
must no longer be considered by the agent to be satisfied, and must be
removed from the set of goals.
− Rejected norms only affect the set of goals hindered by the associated
punishments (hps). This set of goals must be removed; this is the way in
which normative agents accept the consequences of their decisions.
The process to comply with the norms an agent has decided to fulfill is
specified in the NormComply schema. Through this process, the set of goals
is updated according to our discussion above.
NormComply
∆NormAgentState
let ngs ==
⋃{gs : PGoal |
(∃n : intended • gs = n.ngoals)} •
let hngs ==
⋃{gs : PGoal | (∃n : intended •
gs = hinder (goals,n.ngoals))} •
let brs ==
⋃{gs : PGoal | (∃n : intended •
gs = benefit(goals,n.rewards))} •
let hps ==
⋃{gs : PGoal | (∃n : rejected •
gs = hinder (goals,n.punishments))} •
( goals ′ = (goals ∪ ngs)\
(hngs ∪ brs ∪ hps))
However, to make the model simple, we assume that punishments are
always applied, and rewards are always given, though the possibility exists
that agents never become either punished or rewarded. In addition, note that
the set of goals hindered by normative goals can be empty if the norm being
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considered is a non-conflicting norm, and goals hindered by punishments or
goals that benefit from rewards can be empty if a norm does not include any
of them. After norm compliance, the goals are updated and, consequently, the
intentions of agents might change.
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Figure 5. Normative Reasoning Processes and Outcomes
Figure 5 summarises the three processes already mentioned and the new
mental attitudes that appear as a consequence of normative reasoning. Con-
tinuous arrows represent the control flow and dashed lines represent data
flow.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a normative framework which, besides pro-
viding the means to computationally represent many normative concepts,
can be used to give a better understanding of norms and normative agent
behaviour. The framework explains not only the role that norms play in a
society but also the elements that constitute a norm and that, in turn, can be
used by agents when decisions concerning norms must be taken. In contrast
to other proposals, our normative framework has been built upon the idea of
autonomy of agents. That is, it is intended to be used by agents that reason
about why norms must be adopted, and why an adopted norm must be com-
plied with. Our framework consists of three main components: a canonical
model of norms, a model of normative multi-agent systems and a model of
normative autonomous agents.
The model of norms differs from others (Boman, 1999; Shoham and
Tennenholtz, 1995; Tuomela, 1995) in the way in which patterns of behaviour
are prescribed. To describe the pattern of behaviour prescribed by a norm,
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other models use actions, so that agents are told what exactly they must do.
By contrast, we use normative goals, which is an idea more compatible with
autonomous agents whose behaviour is driven by goals. Agents can choose
the way to satisfy the normative goals, instead of being told exactly how it
must be done. Our work also emphasises that all norms can be represented
by using similar components, and that they are analysed by agents in similar
ways. However, what makes one norm different from another is the way in
which norms are created, how long they are valid, and the reasons agents have
to adopt them. These factors enable norms to be divided into categories such
as obligations and prohibitions, social commitments and social codes.
A collateral result of our work is the proposed model for interlock-
ing norms. These relations between norms have already been mentioned in
several papers, especially from philosophical and legal perspectives (Ross,
1968), but no ways to model them have been provided. Dignum’s concept
of authorisations (Dignum, 1999) attempts to describe norms activated when
others are not fulfilled; however, his idea and models are incomplete. We
claim that this form of representing connections between norms can be used
not only to represent enforcement and reward norms, but also to represent
things as complex as contracts and deals among agents. Enforcement and re-
ward norms are a special case of interlocking norms, they prescribe what must
be done in the cases in which a norm becomes either fulfilled or unfulfilled.
Although this way of relating norms allows the representation of contrary-to-
duty norms it does not eliminate those pitfalls related to the contrary-to-duty
or the dilemma paradoxes (van der Torre and Tan, 2000). How to deal with
these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
In contrast to current models of systems regulated by norms (Balzer and
Tuomela, 2001; Dignum, 2004; Dignum and Dignum, 2001; Esteva et al.,
2001; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995) in which no distinction among norms
is made, our work emphasises that besides the general norms of the system,
at least three kinds of norms are needed, namely norms to legislate, to pun-
ish, and to reward other agents. By making this differentiation, agents are
able to determine when an issued norm is valid, when an entitled agent can
apply a punishment, and who is responsible for giving rewards. In addition,
order is imposed on agents responsible for the normative behaviour of other
agents, because their authority is defined by the norms that entitle them to
exert social pressure. Roles for legislators, defenders, and promoters of norms
become easily identified as a consequence of the different kinds of norms
considered. Thus, in this framework, the authority of agents is always sup-
ported and constrained by norms. Our framework does not intent to override
other frameworks such as those already mentioned above rather it intends
to complement them. Current work is doing to use the framework to imple-
ment normative agents, virtual communities of service provider agents, and
to represent contracts and contract reasoning.
A Normative Framework for Agent-Based Systems 24
References
Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. The American Political Science
Review, 80(4):1095–1111.
Balzer, W. and Tuomela, R. (2001). Social institutions, norms and practices. In Dellarocas,
C. and Conte, R., editors, Social Order in Multi-Agent Systems, pages 161–180. Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Barbuceanu, M., Gray, T., and Mankovski, S. (1999). The role of obligations in multiagent
coordination. Applied Artificial Intelligence, 13(1/2):11–38.
Bicchieri, C. (1990). Norms of cooperation. Ethics, 100(4):838–861.
Boella, G. and Lesmo, L. (2001). Deliberative normative agents. In Dellarocas, C. and
Conte, R., editors, Social Order in Multi-Agent Systems, pages 85–110. Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Boman, M. (1999). Norms in artificial decision making. Artificial Intelligence and Law,
7(1):17–35.
Castelfranchi, C., Conte, R., and Paolucci, M. (1998). Normative reputation and the cost of
compliance. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 1(3).
Castelfranchi, C., Dignum, F., Jonker, C., and Treur, J. (2000). Deliberative normative agents:
Principles and architecture. In Jennings, N. and Lesperance, Y., editors, Intelligent Agents
VI (ATAL’99), LNAI 1757, pages 206–220. Springer-Verlag.
Conte, R. and Castelfranchi, C. (1995). Cognitive and Social Action. UCL Press.
Conte, R., Castelfranchi, C., and Dignum, F. (1999a). Autonomous norm-acceptance. In
Mu¨ller, J., Singh, M., and Rao, A., editors, Intelligent Agents V (ATAL’98), LNAI 1555,
pages 319–333. Springer-Verlag.
Conte, R. and Dellarocas, C. (2001). Social order in info societies: An old challenge for
innovation. In Dellarocas, C. and Conte, R., editors, Social Order in Multi-Agent Systems,
pages 1–15. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Conte, R., Falcone, R., and Sartor, G. (1999b). Agents and norms: How to fill the gap?
Artificial Intelligence and Law, 7(1):1–15.
Dellarocas, C. and Klein, M. (2001). Contractual agent societies: Negotiated shared context
and social control in open multi-agent systems. In Dellarocas, C. and Conte, R., editors,
Social Order in Multi-Agent Systems, pages 113–133. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Dignum, F. (1999). Autonomous agents with norms. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 7(1):69–
79.
Dignum, F., Morley, D., Sonenberg, E., and Cavendon, L. (2000). Towards socially
sophisticated BDI agents. In Durfee, E. H., editor, Proceedings on the Fourth Interna-
tional Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS-00), pages 111–118. IEEE Computer
Society.
Dignum, V. (2004). A Model for Organizational Interaction. Phd, University of Utrecht, The
Netherlands.
Dignum, V. and Dignum, F. (2001). Modelling agent societies: Coordination frameworks
and institutions. In Brazdil, P. and Jorge, A., editors, Progress in Artificial Intelligence
Knowledge Extraction, Multi-agent Systems, Logic Programming, and Constraint Solving,
LNAI 2258, pages 191–204. Springer-Verlag.
d’Inverno, M. and Luck, M. (2003). Understanding Agent Systems. Springer-Verlag, second
edition.
Esteva, M., Padget, J., and Sierra, C. (2001). Formalizing a language for institutions and
norms. In Meyer, J. and Tambe, M., editors, Intelligent Agents VIII (ATAL’01), LNAI
2333, pages 348–366. Springer-Verlag.
Hashimoto, T. and Egashira, S. (2001). Formation of social norms in communicating agents
with cognitive frameworks. Systems Science and Complexity, 14(1):54–74.
A Normative Framework for Agent-Based Systems 25
Jones, A. and Sergot, M. (1996). A formal characterisation of institutionalised power. Logic
Journal of the IGPL, 4(3):429–445.
Lo´pez y Lo´pez, F. (2003). Social Powers and Norms: Impact on Agent Behaviour. Phd,
University of Southampton, England.
Lo´pez y Lo´pez, F. and Luck, M. (2003). Modelling norms for autonomous agents. In Cha´vez,
E., Favela, J., Mejı´a, M., and Oliart, A., editors, Proceedings of the Fourth Mexican In-
ternational Conference on Computer Science (ENC’03), pages 238–245. IEEE Computer
Society.
Lo´pez y Lo´pez, F. and Luck, M. (2004). A model of normative multi-agent systems and
dynamic relationships. In Lindemann, G., Moldt, D., and Paolucci, M., editors, Regulated
Agent-Based Social Systems, LNAI 2934, pages 259–280. Springer-Verlag.
Lo´pez y Lo´pez, F., Luck, M., and d’Inverno, M. (2002). Constraining autonomy through
norms. In Castelfranchi, C. and Johnson, W., editors, Proceedings of The First Inter-
national Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems AAMAS’02,
pages 674–681. ACM Press.
Lo´pez y Lo´pez, F., Luck, M., and d’Inverno, M. (2004). Normative agent reasoning in dynamic
societies. In Jennings, N., Sierra, C., Sonenberg, L., and Tambe, L., editors, Proceedings of
The Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems
AAMAS’04, pages 730–737. ACM Press.
Luck, M., McBurney, P., and Preist, C. (2003). Agent Technology: Enabling Next Generation
Computing (A Roadmap for Agent Based Computing). AgentLink.
Norman, T., Sierra, C., and Jennings, N. (1998). Rights and commitments in multi-agent
agreements. In Demazeau, Y., editor, Proceedings of the Third International Conference
on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS-98), pages 222–229. IEEE Computer Society Press.
Ross, A. (1968). Directives and Norms. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.
Sergot, M. (1999). Normative positions. In McNamara, P. and Prakken, H., editors, Norms,
Logics and Information Systems, pages 289–308. IOS Press.
Shoham, Y. and Tennenholtz, M. (1995). On social laws for artificial agent societies: Off-line
design. Artificial Intelligence, 73(1-2):231–252.
Singh, M. (1999). An ontology for commitments in multiagent systems: Toward a unification
of normative concepts. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 7(1):97–113.
Spivey, J. M. (1992). The Z Notation: A Reference Manual. Prentice-Hall.
Tuomela, R. (1995). The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Norms.
Stanford University Press.
Tuomela, R. and Bonnevier-Toumela, M. (1995). Norms and agreements. European Journal
of Law, Philosophy and Computer Sience, 5:41–46.
Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1977). The Emergence of Norms. Oxford University Press.
van der Torre, L. and Tan, Y. (1999a). Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preference-based
dyadic obligations. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 27(1-4):49–78.
van der Torre, L. and Tan, Y. (1999b). Rights, duties and commitments between agents.
In Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 1239–1246.
van der Torre, L. and Tan, Y. (2000). Dynamic normative reasoning under uncertainty. In
Smets, P. and Gabbay, D., editors, Agents, Reasoning and Dynamics. Kluwer.
Walker, A. and Wooldridge, M. (1995). Understanding the emergence of conventions in multi-
agent systems. In Lesser, V. and Gasser, L., editors, Proceedings of the First International
Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS’95), pages 384–389. AAAI Press/MIT Press.
Wieringa, R., Dignum, F., Meyer, J., and Kuiper, R. (1996). A modal approach to intentions,
commitments and obligations: Intention plus commitment yields obligation. In Brown,
M. and Carmo, J., editors, Deontic Logic, Agency and Normative Systems, pages 80–97.
Springer-Verlag.

